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Summary 
This report on Cambodia is one of a set of four country case studies designed to study the 
implications of closing civic space for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
The case study was commissioned in response to the wave of legal, administrative, political and 
informal means to restrict civic space and the activities of civil society actors in countries around the 
world in the past decade. Based on a literature review and conceptual framework developed for the 
study (see also Hossain et al 2018), the report documents changing civic space in Cambodia. The 
country is characterized by a centralised political system where power is increasingly concentrated 
in the hands of the dominant ruling class. Development policy has prioritized high-growth goals, with 
documented violations of land, labour and freedom of speech rights in the process. The case study 
documents the impacts on specific Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) objectives, including no 
poverty (SDG 1), zero hunger (SDG 2), decent work (SDG 8), gender and economic equality (SDGs 5 
and 10) inclusive communities (SDG 11), life on the land (SDG 15).  
 
The study found that: 
 
• Since the near-defeat of the ruling party in the 2013 elections, which was attributed in part 
to a partisan or pro-opposition civil society and media, civic space has become narrower and 
the fit between civil society and the state has become more difficult and more contentious.  
• There was evidence of CSOs and related programmes which made contributions to inclusive 
forms of development, including, but not only, in terms of service delivery 
• China’s emergence as a development actor in Cambodia appears to be changing the 
normative environment within which policies on civil society and thinking about its role in 
the development process are made 
• Key areas of recent rights violations related to land grabbing and unsustainable land 
management, labour rights, particularly in the vital global export sectors, and media 
freedom, where the scope to report independently on problems of corruption or 
macroeconomic management has been squeezed 
• Impacts of shrinking civic space can be traced through to  
o SDG 2 (Zero hunger): food production and small scale agriculture are likely to be 
affected, particularly among indigenous and minority populations facing the effects 
of land grabs and policies supporting agricultural commercialization; there is limited 
space for civil society actors to influence policy, although various efforts at 
monitoring are made 
o SDG 5 (Gender (in)equality): the impacts on women’s groups of new regulations 
restricting advocacy work and mobilization are particularly harsh. Curbing 
Cambodian women’s organizations is likely to impact adversely on critical areas 
where women’s development is at stake, including with respect to practices of 
gender discrimination, boosting women’s participation and land title security, and 
urban women’s safety 
o SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth): industrial workers have limited rights, 
low pay and poor working conditions; however, workers’ rights to organize are very 
limited, and in practice, labour leaders are subject to violence and intimidation. 
Cambodia remains low in global value chains, using suppression of (mostly women) 
workers’ rights to keep wages low 
o SDG 10 and SDG 11 (Inequalities of income, between rural and urban areas, and 
within cities and urban communities): economic inequalities are widely understood 
to have increased, because of the pattern of growth which favours big development 
projects and dispossesses the less powerful. NGOs have played an important role in 
supporting inclusive urbanization in a process of rapid real estate development, 
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including in highlighting disparities and priorities for action and actively defending 
citizens’ rights, but restrictions on media are deepening rural-urban differences 
o SDG 15 (Life on Land): in a context in which the political elite is closely connected to 
actors with interests in forests and timber, conservation has been adversely affected 
by restrictions on civil society’s ability to monitor or campaign effectively against 
land grabbing, large-scale agricultural concessions and hydroelectric power dam 
construction.  
 
The report concludes with some discussion of the implications of these findings for Cambodia. The 
present study offers important, albeit limited, insights into the impacts of restricted and repressed 
civil society on key development outcomes, and highlights issues on which further analysis may help 
to build the developmental case for civic space in Cambodia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Background 
This report on Cambodia is one of a set of four country case studies designed to study the 
implications of closing civic space for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
It adopts a theoretical and analytical framework developed in a synthesis report entitled The 
Implications of Closing Civic Space for Development (set out in more detail in Hossain et al 2018). The 
study was commissioned from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) by the ACT Alliance during 
2017-18 in response to the wave of legal, administrative, political and informal means to restrict 
civic space and the activities of civil society actors in countries around the world in the past decade.  
 
It was motivated specifically by the need to assess the implications for development outcomes, as 
measured by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This reflects the wide body of evidence 
that civil society has played a significant role in promoting inclusive, equitable and sustainable 
modes of development in the past, and reasonable concerns that closures of civic space may choke 
off pathways to the achievement of the SDGs. The study as a whole comprised: 
● a review of the literature on closing civic space, and the development of a conceptual and 
methodological framework for further study 
● an application of these frameworks to a desk-based analysis of the potential development 
implications of closing civic space in 12 selected countries of interest to the ACT Alliance and 
its wider partnerships 
● a subset of country case studies selected from the 12 for more detailed and empirical 
analysis of development impacts in selected policy domains (land rights, labour rights, social 
inclusion, gender equality, poverty, hunger, and urban livelihoods) were identified as of 
potential relevance in four countries: Brazil, Cambodia, Nepal, and Zimbabwe.  
 
Cambodia country case study  
The country cases were selected in part to represent different pathways in the political economy of 
development. Cambodia represents a political settlement in which in the post-conflict period, 
political power has been dominated by a single party, which has controlled the political landscape 
and pushed through major development reforms, including opening up the country to foreign 
investment, trade and international aid. This has been reflected in relatively rapid, if uneven, 
improvements in basic economic and human development indicators. In recent years, however, that 
political dominance has been tested in both commune and national elections in which the 
opposition won more support than the ruling party expected; this, and the perceived relationship 
between a free media, comparatively open civil society space, and gains by the opposition, have 
prompted a crackdown on civic space in the country.  
 
An initial literature review and scoping study identified the two issues of land rights and labour 
rights as areas of contention in which closing civic space was likely to have the most impacts on 
development outcomes. Other negative impacts identified include poverty and hunger, economic 
inequality, rural livelihoods, decent work, and gender equality. To explore these issues further, an 
IDS researcher with expertise in environmental policy and civil society in Asia and a scholar of 
Cambodian civil society, social movements, and land rights, worked together to study these issues in 
more depth. They identified relevant experts and actors in key sectors willing to discuss these issues. 
The security situation only allowed conducting interviews within the capital of Phnom Penh. 
Interviews were undertaken with key informants from across civil society, government, and business 
(where relevant) during March and April 2018. In total 18 interviews were conducted. All interviews 
were conducted in a tense atmosphere and both researchers and interview partners were 
concerned about security risks. To protect identities of interview partners, no identifying features 
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are provided in this report. Some of our interviewees informed us that they were being followed and 
under observation. Some NGOs applied a strict security measure before we entered their offices; 
mobile phones were not allowed to be brought in. Most communication with informants was 
conducted through WhatsApp, Skype and email rather than telephone. In addition to collecting first-
hand information through the 18 interviews, the researchers collected secondary data from news 
reports and academic literature and collected and analysed civic space, statistical and development 
performance data to situate and illuminate the case further. Finally, we had planned a group 
discussion workshop with ten stakeholders, but only three of them turned up due to the security 
concerns and the government restrictions on assembly. It was not possible to conduct a stakeholder 
workshop as intended. 
 
The findings of the case study are set out as follows. Section 2 sets out the challenge of sustainable 
development in Cambodia, exploring development achievements to date, the role of civil society in 
development, the political economy of sustainable development, the nature of closing civic space, 
and the roles of international aid donors and development partners, including China, in shaping civic 
space and the development process. Section 3 presents the main findings from the interviews and 
fieldwork, analysing the implications for land rights, labour rights, and the freedom of the media 
through a closer look at the relevant SDGs which are either already being negatively affected and are 
likely to be further affected by closing civic space in Cambodia. Section 4 draws together conclusions 
from the analysis, and discusses some of the implications for analysing and programming to address 
the potential adverse consequences of restrictions on civil society for the achievement of the SDGs. 
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2. The challenge of sustainable development in Cambodia 
 
Development performance 
Cambodia’s development progress since 1990 must be understood in terms of the devastation of the 
economy, the society and its political institutions through 30 years of internal and international 
conflict, including in the American/Viet Nam war (Arias-Vazquez et al. 2014). The population halved, 
cities were depopulated, and displacement meant loss of land and livelihoods for thousands. The 
rapid reduction of income-poverty and the establishment of public services and private sources of 
economic growth since the 1990s is remarkable against this backdrop. Growth has averaged 7 per 
cent over the past decade and a half, and after an unequalizing start, has been contributing to 
improved income equality since 2007. This is so despite a dramatic halt to economic growth in 2009, 
as the country suffered from the global economic downturn, and experienced low or negative 
growth, before recovering promptly in 2010 (see Figure 1). The country ‘graduated’ from Least 
Developed Country to Lower-Middle Income status in 2015. Yet while in the past few years, 
Cambodia has been experiencing higher GDP growth rates than comparable countries in East Asia, 
per capita GDP growth has been somewhat slower. As Figure 2 shows, per capita income growth has 
also been slow in Cambodia compared to its neighbouring countries, and far closer to that of other 
low income countries. Among other factors, this reflects the relatively slower gains in labour 
productivity, and lower levels of human capital in the country (World Bank 2017). 
 
 
Figure 1 GDP growth and GDP per capita growth 
 
Source: 1 World Development Indicators, accessed April 16th 2018 
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Figure 2 GDP per capita 
 
Source: 2 World Development Indicators, accessed April 16th 2018 
 
The proportion of the population living below the national poverty line1 more than halved, from 50 
per cent of the population to 13.5 per cent between 2003 and 2014; the pace of poverty reduction 
has slowed more recently (Arias-Vazquez et al. 2014). Many of those newly non-poor remain close 
to the poverty line, and vulnerable to dipping back into poverty, depending on movements in wages 
and costs of living (Arias-Vazquez et al. 2014). Other indicators of development progress include life 
expectancy, maternal and infant mortality rates, immunization, educational enrolments, and water 
and sanitation access, which show comparatively rapid gains for Cambodia, but which still leave it 
lagging behind other comparator countries (IDA and IBRD countries) in the region (see Table 1). It is 
also notable that the pace of progress appears to have been higher in the 2000s than in the past 5 
years, when gains have been somewhat slower in areas such as life expectancy, immunization, and 
maternal and infant mortality (see dotted trendlines in Annex Figures 3-6).  
 
 
Table 1 Cambodia and the region, selected human development indicators 
 
Indicator 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Cambodia Adjusted net enrolment rate, primary (% of primary 
school age children) 
92 
 
93 95 
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 
months) 
65 79 89 81 
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with 
access) 
16 25 34 42 
Improved water source (% of population with access) 42 53 64 76 
                                                     
1 Cambodia uses an absolute poverty line definition. In 2013, the Ministry of Planning (MOP) introduced new 
poverty lines of KHR 3,871 (USD 0.98) which is lower than the $1.25 absolute poverty line set by the World 
Bank. The revisions to the Cambodian poverty lines include (i) a food poverty line based on 2,200 calories per 
person per day (up from 2,100); (ii) a non-food component that is estimated separately for Phnom Penh, other 
urban, and rural areas. The poverty line is calculated based on the Cambodia Socioeconomic Survey (CSES) 
data, the latest being from CSES 2009. Source: http://www.thepovertyline.net/cambodia/ 
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Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 58 63 66 68 
Vulnerable employment, total (% of total 
employment) 
85 78 70 54 
      
East Asia 
& Pacific 
(IDA & 
IBRD) 
Adjusted net enrolment rate, primary (% of primary 
school age children) 
95 95 96 
 
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 
months) 
83 85 93 92 
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with 
access) 
58 64 70 75 
Improved water source (% of population with access) 80 85 90 94 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 71 72 74 74 
Vulnerable employment, total (% of total 
employment) 
56 49 43 38 
Source: 3 World Development Indicators 
 
A recent diagnostic study noted that the conditions that enabled Cambodia’s stellar performance in 
reducing poverty since the 2000s may not continue to generate such rapid progress (World Bank 
2017). Among other factors, low educational and health outcomes, including the enduring effects of 
malnutrition, hamper economic mobility and labour productivity. Among the unmet MDGs were 
tuberculosis incidence, environmental sustainability and gender equality. Persistently high rates of 
maternal mortality and the absence of social protection against weather and financial shocks 
highlight the weakness of public service delivery for the poor masses, particularly in rural areas. 
Other major concerns included problems of corruption and weak governance, including in relation to 
the business. Problems of land-grabbing and associated loss of livelihood on a large scale, 
particularly among indigenous communities, were also noted (World Bank 2017), an issue which is 
further analysed in this report.  
 
Finally, Cambodia’s development performance is strongly impacted by inequality. Income inequality 
has been declining, and between 2012 and 2015 the Gini coefficient of Cambodia indicated an 
improvement or equalization of the income distribution, declining from 36.03 to 30.76 (UNDP 2017). 
Nevertheless, inequality still hampers development performance, as shown through the inequality-
adjusted human development index (IHDI). Cambodia’s human development index (HDI) for 2015 
was 0.563. However, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.436, a loss of 22.5 
percent due to inequality (UNDP 2016). In terms of gender inequality, Cambodia has a gender 
inequality index (GII) value of 0.479, ranking it 112 out of 159 countries in the 2015 index. Indicators 
of gender inequality in Cambodia are among the worst in the East Asia and Pacific region, with only 
Myanmar and Lao PDR performing worse. For every 100,000 live births, 161 women die from 
pregnancy related causes compared to 62 in the region; and the adolescent birth rate is 50 births per 
1,000 women of ages 15-19, compared to an average of 22 in the East Asia and Pacific region (UNDP 
2018). Female participation in the labour market is 75.5 percent compared to 86.7 for men (UNDP 
2016). 
 
In the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a number of remaining developmental 
challenges will require increased attention over the next decade, some of which are presented in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Selected SDG priority targets and indicators for Cambodia (not exclusive, selected based on data availability) 
SDG Target Indicator  Year Value 
2.1.1 Prevalence of undernourishment (%) 2014-2016 15.3 
2.2.1 Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 (%) 2014 32.4 
3.1.1 Maternal mortality ratio ((per 100,000 live births) 2015 161 
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3.3.2 Tuberculosis incidence (per 100,000 population) 2016 345 
6.1.1 Proportion of population using safe drinking water (%) 2015 24.1 
7.1.1 Proportion of population with access to electricity (%) 2016 49.8 
11.1.1 Proportion of urban population in slums (%) 2014 55.1 
Source: ADB Basic 2018 Statistics 
 
The role of civil society in sustainable development in Cambodia 
Civil society and NGOs have been prominent actors in Cambodia’s development process, with the 
country featuring one of the world’s highest concentrations of such organizations since the 1990s. 
Civil society actors cover a wide range of issues, including service delivery, promoting good 
governance, conservation, peace-building, and human rights, and are found in each province and in 
every sector of Cambodia’s development. A review of civil society in Cambodia identified five areas 
in which international NGOs and their national partner NGOs were particularly prominent in 
development: i) large scale service delivery programmes, often involving multilateral financing; ii) 
complementing or partnering in local-level service-delivery with Government; iii) community 
development activities at the village level; iv) capacity building of local NGOs and CSOs; and v) 
research and analysis for advocacy on development-related issues (Sunderji 2011). However, a 
significant body of analysis identifies Cambodian civil society as often inadequately linked to 
grassroots concerns and overly dependent on foreign aid funding, and oriented to external concerns 
more than local civic capacities and activism (Bandyopadhyay et al 2013; Frewer 2013; Netra et al 
2015; Norman 2014; Sivhuoch and Sedara 2013).  
 
Aid funding has been crucial: from 1992 to 2011, total aid to Cambodia amounted to USD 12.13 
billion. Among several donors, the EU funded about 22 per cent of the total budget and is by far the 
largest donor to Cambodia (RGC, 2011). More than 9 per cent of the total was funded by and 
through local and international NGOs, whose numbers increased from a handful in the early 1990s 
to 3,492 in 2010 (CCC, 2012). Through NGOs, per year aid increased significantly from USD 206.1 
million in 2009 to USD 220.4 million in 2010 (RGC, 2011). Most aid goes to around 1,350 NGOs 
working in several sectors. Although the impacts of these NGOs’ activities are difficult to assess, 
their activities reached and benefited at least between 2.8 to 4.5 million Cambodians over the 
period (CCC, 2012).  
 
It is arguably the case that NGOs, especially through their service delivery approaches as well as 
advocacy and legal rights support for marginalised groups, have considerably contributed to 
achieving national development objectives. Yet, recently, there has been a considerable shift from 
the latter approaches to an empowerment, advocacy and rights-based approach, empowering 
grassroots community-based organization (CBOs) to advocate with and even to confront the neo-
liberalized development policies of the government (Young, 2016a). This shift in NGO and 
international development agency agendas has explicitly changed from service delivery-focused 
approaches to empowering local beneficiaries to ensure long-term and sustainable development in 
general and to the adoption of rights-based approaches in particular (Young, unpublished).  
 
The political economy of sustainable development in Cambodia  
Development policies and the drivers of closing civic space in Cambodia are jointly shaped by the 
nature of its political settlement, in which power has till recently been dominated by the 
‘strongman’ regime of Hun Sen. The current political settlement in Cambodia originates in the 1979 
overthrow of the Khmer Rouge by the Kampuchea People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). Hun Sen has 
ruled Cambodia for three decades, amassing a fortune estimated at USD200 million (Global Witness 
2016). The Cambodian political elite has, or is closely connected through marriage or kinship with, 
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major economic interests in land and natural resources as well as increasingly in labour-intensive 
export manufacturing sectors. Kelsall and Seng summarise the political settlement in Cambodia as  
 
[A] dominant party system subject, intermittently, to strong competitive challenges; 
institutions are primarily personalistic, although some islands of rule-governed behaviour 
can be found … as a hybrid predatory-developmental dominant regime with a combination 
of hierarchical and multi-stakeholder governance, it will produce moderately effective 
developmental outcomes (Kelsall and Heng 2016a, 240). 
 
Since the late 1990s, the Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) has governed over a volatile but growing 
economy with what is widely viewed as a particularly brutal hand (Deth and Bultmann 2016; Adams 
2015). Growth rates have been high, but the benefits have been skewed in favour of elite groups 
(Weinberg 1997), rather than being evenly distributed, and enabled political power to concentrate. 
Recent rural economic growth, substantially driven by higher rice prices after the global food price 
crisis of 2008, has driven down poverty in the rural heartlands, amid a wider process of de-
agrarianization. The rapid rise in industrial disputes and strikes in the period after 2010 indicates a 
high degree of dissatisfaction among the important export manufacturing sector workers. In one 
view, labour is seen by the state as a commodity to serve the political and wealth accumulation 
interests of ruling elites, but also as a problem to be managed through semi-authoritarian modes of 
governance aiming to maintain order and stability’ (Ward and Mouyly 2016, 261). 
 
The elections of 2013 saw the CPP barely win against the new Cambodian National Rescue Party, 
which won a surprisingly large number of votes despite reported rigging by the CPP. This apparently 
reflected a surge of popularity with the vast tech-connected youth population, particularly in urban 
areas (Mccargo 2014; Osborne 2015). A key event in recent political affairs was the murder of 
prominent critic of the state, Kem Ley, in 2016; the assassin was apparently apprehended, but state-
backed forces are feared to have been behind the death (Freedom House 2017d). The new threat to 
Hun Sen’s political dominance also explains why the opposition leader, Kem Sokha, was arrested and 
charged with treason in September 2017, ahead of the 2018 general elections. If convicted, Sokha 
could face a 30-year jail term (ICNL 2017b). In November 2017, the Supreme Court ruled to dissolve 
the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), removing the only existing electoral threat to Prime 
Minister Hun Sen. Other political leaders, human rights activities and journalists have been charged 
or convicted of criminal offences, and are either in exile or are held in detention. In October 2017, 
Senator Hong Sok Hour of the CNRP was pardoned from the seven-year jail sentence he had been 
given over a Facebook posting (Thul 2017).  
 
The political settlement in Cambodia has faced more competition in the recent past, but the 
government remains powerful enough to maintain its broadly pro-growth strategy alongside high 
levels of corruption, particularly in the extractives and natural resource sectors. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into Cambodia has played an important role for the country’s development, 
especially in terms of boosting GDP growth and supporting the government’s development agenda. 
FDI inflows have grown exponentially in the last few years due to sound macroeconomic policies, 
political stability, regional economic growth and an open investment market. FDI reached USD 1.92 
billion in 2016, up from USD 1.7 billion in 2015 (Santander 2017). Especially FDI in the extractive 
industry is booming. Including projects expected to be approved before the end of the year 2018, 
FDI in mining and other extractive sectors equals USD 1.3 billion, making it one of the most valuable 
economic sectors in Cambodia (Vannak, 2018). 
 
The Cambodian government appears to be pursuing development without much reference to good 
governance. This reflects the personalistic character of the Cambodian state and of policymaking 
(Kelsall and Heng 2016b; Kelsall and Seiha 2014). Overall, Cambodia is considered to be a political 
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system with a dominant party that seeks top-down control over the economy and society, with a 
view to consolidate the interests of its political elite instead of aiming for most inclusive economic 
development outcomes. In this context, development progress has been uneven:  
 
[A]lthough significant developmental progress is possible in circumscribed areas, especially 
those with support from multiple stakeholders, outside these channels, provision of 
development-enhancing public goods and services is likely to be poor (Kelsall and Heng 
2016a, 240). 
 
The uneven distribution of services, however, becomes evident in the urban-rural comparison. For 
example, in terms of provision of drinking water, the proportion of the population using safely 
managed drinking water services in urban areas is 55 per cent, in rural areas 16 per cent (ADB 2018). 
Development progress is most likely to occur where it is politically acceptable or even necessary for 
the elite, and where external support is available. ‘Hard-to-reach’ groups, including those who are 
marginalized because of ethnicity, geography or occupation, are unlikely to be able to amplify their 
demands in such dominant settings. Land and resource (and therefore livelihood) rights of such 
groups are particularly vulnerable in such settings. The political settlement, and stakeholder 
involvement, have meant areas of progress where policy reforms went with the political ‘grain’, for 
instance in widening education participation in the 1990s and 2000s. In other areas, where, for 
instance, better quality performance might make more demands on the state to challenge the 
interests of groups like teachers or doctors or local officials in the interests of strengthening 
accountability, the impacts of reforms are much more uncertain (Kelsall and Heng 2016b; Kelsall et 
al. 2016). It is notable that gender relations have proven stubbornly resistant to equity reforms, and 
Cambodia’s overall performance on the MDGs was weakened by its poor performance on gender 
equality (ADB 2012). This also affects other areas of weak performance, such as infant and maternal 
mortality, and child nutrition. 
 
Changing civic space: before and after elections 
It is in this context of a political settlement facing competitive pressures from political opposition 
groups, critical civil society organisations and media actors, that new restrictions on civic space must 
be situated. Formal civil society in the liberal democratic model has limited roots in Cambodia, 
where social organization has customarily been dominated by informal pagoda committees, situated 
in kin and community networks. Contemporary civil society organizations are financed 
predominantly by aid, leaving them vulnerable to charges of pursuing foreign agendas (Dosch 2012; 
Norman 2014; Landau 2008). The international influence has been comparatively strong in 
Cambodian civil society, with recent-past UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, noting the role of international human rights 
defenders in pushing back against the proposed 2013 NGO law, which would have greatly restricted 
CSO activity (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). In 2015, the Cambodian NGO Law (LANGO) was 
passed in 2015 and has been used as an instrument to restrict CSO activity. According to the Civic 
Freedom Monitor of the International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL), in Cambodia there are 
approximately 4,953 registered NGOs and associations, but it is estimated that approximately only 
1,350 organizations have remained active (ICNL 2018).  
 
In the past decade, social movements and other forms of resistance, opposing deals on large-scale 
land acquisition, natural resource extraction and labour wags, have become more prominent in 
Cambodia. Such movements are often sparked by CSO or NGO support and financial assistance 
(Young, 2016b). A combination of local resistance with trans-local and trans-national activists has 
been prominent in some of the many ongoing natural resource-related struggles in the country. In 
some instances, this civic action has succeeded in slowing or amending the terms of state-sponsored 
land deals (Young 2016c). There are also signs that the response to resistance to land deals has 
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shifted away from outright repression towards the use of legal and institutional means to regulate 
civic action and protest. These changes reflect in part a need to respond to stronger popular 
demands for legitimacy and accountability (Beban, So, and Un 2017). 
 
Labour rights struggles, particularly in the important export garments sector, have been increasingly 
prominent, reportedly rising by 225 per cent between 2010 and 2013. This is likely to reflect a) the 
declining real wages of garments workers under conditions of urban inflation, b) the in principle 
enabling regulatory framework for labour rights since the constitutional reforms of 1993, but also c) 
the low level of institutionalization of trades unions. Labour struggles must also be understood as 
part of transnational political settlements, as states experience external pressures to manage labour 
either according to bilateral trade standards or international human rights standards, as well as to 
suppress labour to keep profits high.  
 
The pressures are exercised through both formal and informal means. Reforms to the regulatory 
framework of employment relations have centred on the inclusion of labour rights provisions in the 
1993 Constitution and the passing of the 1997 Labour Law, which incorporated a progressive range 
of rights and protections for workers. International interests, including international labour rights 
movements, are reflected in concerns about garment sector labour standards, which provided the 
foundation for the bilateral US–Cambodia Trade Agreement. The influence of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) is also evident in the tripartite framework of the formal industrial relations 
systems and its provisions on freedom of association, collective bargaining and arbitration. However, 
there Cambodia’s formally progressive framework of labour regulation is contradicted by how labour 
rights are negotiated and realized (or denied) in practice. The extent to which legal protections 
ensure workers’ rights and allow them to pursue their collective interests is influenced by the 
political environment, uneven systems of governance, constraints on political activism and sustained 
intervention by foreign donors (Ward and Mouyly 2016, 259). Most recently, labour rights have been 
impacted by the 2017 Trade Union Law which limits the freedom of association and implicates trade 
unions’ ability to exercise labour rights in the Cambodian garment sector. The Trade Union Law has 
been analysed from international and domestic law and is considered a clear violation to the ILO 
Convention No 87, international laws and consequently the Cambodian Constitution (Ski 2017). 
 
Popular civic and political engagement has also been shaped by new digital space, in particular the 
rapid uptake of social media in Cambodia. By early 2017, the number of active social media users in 
Cambodia was estimated between 4.1 and 4.8 million, between 26 and 32 per cent of the 
population, most on mobile devices, according to various sources. On the one hand, Cambodian 
politicians have recognized the political utility of reaching people directly through their Facebook 
newsfeeds (Young & Peou, unpublished) to spread pro-government information. On the other hand, 
young civic actors and activists rely heavily on social media uptake and hidden tactics to exert 
influence on public issues using social media in a highly contentious, high-risk political climate to 
express dissent under state control and surveillance (Lee 2018). Under the new political settlement 
in Cambodia, the Internet and social media have become a major means as a platform to mobilize 
communities. Digital civic space is an important new space for civil society, in particular if physical 
spaces for assembly or protest movements are closed. However, the government acting on online 
activism and online dissent. In early 2016, a new law increased the government’s authority over the 
telecommunications industry to include “overbroad surveillance powers”. A pending cybercrime law 
is also raising concerns about legal limits on what users are allowed to post on the Internet, possibly 
further restricting digital spaces. 
 
Civic space is closely affected by political space, and here changes have been marked since the 2013 
elections, as noted above. The opposition leader was detained under sedition charges in September 
2017. There is a strong nationalistic tone to the charge, but civic and political rights of citizens are 
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more broadly under attack. In its first year of operation, in 2016-17 alone, the Fundamental 
Freedoms Project documented hundreds of abuses and violations of the freedoms of association, 
expression and assembly (FFMP 2017). NGOs are permitted to operate within a narrow sphere of 
mainly service-delivery activities (ICNL 2018). The media, in particular broadcast and the internet, 
has also become dominated by regime cronies (Jones 2014) but remains subject to extensive legal 
and extra-legal barriers to freedom of speech. In 2017, dozens of radio stations have been taken off 
air and newspapers have faced legal and other charges. One of the leading English-language dailies, 
the Cambodia Daily, faced a back-tax charge which it described as ‘an assault on press freedom 
thinly disguised as a tax dispute’ (Robinson 2017). By the time of conducting interviews in March 
2018, the Cambodia Daily had been closed down and was not reporting any longer. The other 
remaining independent English-language newspaper, the Phnom Penh Post, was sold in May 2018 to 
Sivakumar Ganapathy, managing director of Asia PR, a Malaysian PR company with close ties to 
Prime Minister Hun Sen (Reed 2018). 
 
In addition to these developments, attacks on land rights (affecting some 10,000 families) and labour 
activists have continued (Human Rights Watch 2015a). Labour rights activists attempt to represent 
the interests of 700,000 strong workforce (90 per cent women) that power the USD 5bn industry 
that contributed some 75 per cent of exports in 2013. Labour organization is aggressively restricted - 
Human Rights Watch uncovered 35 cases of union-busting efforts between 2012 and 2015 (Human 
Rights Watch 2015a). The intertwining of formal institutional with informal political practices in the 
balance of power over labour is an important part of understanding how labour rights are 
constrained or contained. 
 
This empowerment and rights-based agenda taken by NGOs emerged in a more open civil society 
space compared to the present, in the period preceding the 2013 elections. However, as NGO 
advocacy became more vocal, and the ruling party lost significant support to the opposition during 
the 2013 election. When asked about how to distinguish the activities of rights-based and advocacy 
NGOs from the opposition party agendas, NGOs claim that they are not too extreme or critical of the 
government. For instance, the opposition party’s activists often refer to their party agenda rather 
than the general issues faced by the citizens. A key informant said: 
 
It is quite difficult to differentiate works between opposition party and CSOs in Cambodia. 
However, we can see that political party’s activists want “change”, referring to change of the 
regime (leaders). So, they show their political inclination. For apolitical NGOs and youth 
activists, they want to contribute to social and community development through reform. For 
NGOs, they do not disclose which political parties they support. 
 
More recently, interviewees reported that the implementation of the Law on Associations and Non-
Governmental Organisations (LANGO) has had a largely negative impact on civil society. According to 
Gemzell (2017), LANGO has increased the pressure on NGOs to follow corrupt government practices 
and get drawn into power hierarchies based on patronage and corruption. LANGO has also opened 
up many new opportunities for authorities to extract resources from NGOs. This is evident in 
underdeveloped rural areas where aid/ NGO funding constitutes one of very few sources of revenue, 
with negative impacts on development outcomes such as poverty alleviation and rural livelihood 
development. LANGO will also increase the pressure on NGOs to allow their projects to be directed 
by CPP development committees or by CPP-controlled government institutions (Gemzell, 2017). 
 
LANGO came into force in 2015 and NGOs were required to follow the new requirements beginning 
in 2016, which has been challenging for many, given the lack of clarity of the law. Since 2017, the 
government has been paying renewed attention to implementation of LANGO through the Ministry 
of the Interior. Although there is no legal requirement for local government to monitor NGO 
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activities, local governments due to their lack of understanding of and incorrect interpretation of 
LANGO are now closely monitoring NGO activities. LANGO also requires political neutrality of NGOs, 
a clause which can be misused by government to restrict NGO activity on the grounds of political 
activism. For example, large mobilisation of participants in events is now severely restricted. 
Through this restriction especially democracy and human rights-related activities are impacted. As 
an interviewee stated: 
 
LANGO as such is not bad a legislation, but the interpretation of the law is problematic for 
NGOs. For example, in practice the letter of informing authorities about project activities has 
been turned into a permission request which can be denied by the authorities. Furthermore, 
the reporting requirements problematic and requires additional staff resources. Copy and 
paste of reports prepared for donors is not possible, and human rights activities cannot be 
reported to government as reporting issues could be used to close down or restrict NGOs. 
 
Western aid donors and civic space 
Cambodia has been a recipient of international aid for decades and the Cambodian aid market has 
become increasingly fragmented and is characterised by the emergence of new donors which has 
brought, according to Sato et al. (2011), healthy competition and new alternatives for Cambodian 
recipients. Not only domestic NGOs, but also the international donor community and large 
international NGOs working in Cambodia are also impacted by the new situation. As a reaction to 
the crackdown on the political opposition, Sweden announced stopping new aid for Cambodia 
(except in education and research) and would no longer support a government reform programme. 
Sweden provided an estimated $100 million in aid over the last five years and ranked third among 
individual EU member states, after France and Germany (Thul 2017). Interviewees also mentioned 
that a number of international donors, in particular organisations from the US, have been accused 
by the government of supporting the ‘colour revolution’ and have therefore been put on a blacklist. 
The use of this term is linked to the investigation of CNRP opposition party members for attempting 
to stage a ‘colour revolution’ in 2017 (Paviour, 2017), a replication of regime change as happened in 
the middle-east. USAID has been targeted by the government and accused of meddling in 
Cambodia’s internal political affairs. Some NGOs receiving funds from US had to stop their projects.  
 
International donors have funded Cambodian NGOs to build grassroots capacity among rural 
community-based organisations and activists, but not political opposition. However, it has been 
perceived by the government to have contributed to the 2013 national election results, a key event 
when the government started seeing civil society and political opposition to be linked. The CNRP was 
the result of a merger between the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party in 2012, both had 
strong links to civil society. The Government observed this quite closely, now both opposition party 
and civic space are restricted, also with impacts on international donors. Western donors are 
increasingly unsure about the current political situation and have no strategy about what to 
anticipate. Some international NGOs have risk management strategies which includes different 
scenarios, including worst-case scenarios and how to mitigate their impact. Most international 
donors and NGOs try to keep out of the immediate political turmoil and keep quiet in order not to 
jeopardise their MoUs with government organisations and the ongoing work they do.  
 
China as a development actor in Cambodia  
In the new political settlement, Western donors have less influence than they once did since China 
has emerged as Cambodia’s biggest aid donor and investor. From the perspective of the Cambodian 
government officials, China is a “good performer” in terms of the overall harmonization efforts led 
by traditional donors, it performs well in terms of alignment with both recipient country needs and 
the predictability of aid provisions, and China has quick delivery and low costs, e.g. in road 
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construction projects (Sato et al. 2011). China’s role in terms of aid and loans to Cambodia has 
gradually surpassed its counterparts: the United States, Japan and European Union (including their 
member states). According to the Royal Government of Cambodia, from 1992 to 2011, out of the 
total amount of aid of US$12.13 billion, China alone contributed 7.1% (RGC, 2011). The grants along 
with (unconditional) loans are expected to increase in the following years. A recent report by the 
Council for the Development of Cambodia (2018) suggests that China, as a development partner, 
contributed 24 percent (US$347.8 million) in 2014, 25 percent (US$339.4 million) in 2015, 22 
percent (US$265.3 million) in 2016, and 16.5 percent (US$223.4 million) in 2017 of the annual 
development cooperation. These funds were mostly allocated to education and transportation 
sectors. 
 
 As of 2017, the Ministry of Economy and Finance debt report showed that its bilateral debt 
increased from US$4.1 billion to US$4.7 billion, of which 80 per cent was owned by China, with 
South Korea being the second largest lender, with US$348 million to Cambodia (Ministry of Economy 
and Finance 2018). This is indicative of the significance of the Chinese government for Cambodia’s 
economy and politics, and suggests that that Chinese aid and loans are likely to have influenced the 
shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia. This view was supported by interviewees. For instance, 
once the mainstream opposition party dissolved in November 2017, the Chinese government 
congratulated and supported the effort of the Royal Government of Cambodia to ensure stability 
and expect that the upcoming election will be held smoothly: 
 
China supports the Cambodian side’s efforts to protect political stability and achieve 
economic development, and believes the Cambodian government can lead the people to deal 
with domestic and foreign challenges, and will smoothly hold elections next year (China’s 
foreign minister Wang Yi, in a statement in November 2017, following the dissolution of the 
opposition party (Reuters, 2017)). 
 
According to interviewees, Chinese aid or grants are managed and administered by Chinese 
GONGOs, such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, which have emerged and have 
started cooperating with some Cambodian NGOs and GONGOs. To this end, a new Forum on Civil 
Society has been established in the Cambodian Council of Ministers where dialogue between and 
among civil society organisations/NGOs will be taking place. The Forum is designed to provide grants 
to its membership NGOs. The NGO Forum on Cambodia has recently started engagement with 
Chinese NGOs working on corporate social responsibility of Chinese companies and other issues. An 
expert stated: 
 
The CSOs Alliance Forum has just been established by the Council of Ministers. The Alliance 
was established to receive funding from China, and then distribute the funds to Cambodian 
NGOs. To receive the funds, NGOs have to align with the CSOs Alliance. The latter is the 
GONGO. 
 
China has been and remains one of the main investors in Cambodia. After the political settlement in 
1993 (the first elections organised by the UN after the collapse of Khmer Rouge), China has returned 
to Cambodia and invested heavily in garment industries, drawn by preferential trade arrangements 
with the US. From 1994-2006, China invested US$1.58 billion, compared to S. Korea’s US$1.36 
billion. In 2012, China outward investment to Cambodia was US$1.19 billion (Council for the 
Development of Cambodia, 2013). While the number of the countries’ investing in Cambodia has not 
been stable, China’s investment has gradually increased its flow. The current investments include, 
but are not limited to, garment factories, infrastructure, real estate, mining, hydroelectric power and 
agricultural land.  
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3. Changes in civic space and SDG outcomes 
 
The Cambodia country case study focuses on three interlinked aspects which have experienced the 
most significant impact from the shrinking civic space in Cambodia - issues of land rights and 
corporate land grabbing, labour rights in the garment sector, and freedom of expression and 
independent journalism of media organisations. In this section we first highlight key concerns arising 
from the interaction between political and civic space before looking more closely at the impacts on 
specific SDGs.  
 
Key areas of rights violations  
Land grabbing and unsustainable land management  
As far back as 2007, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for human 
rights in Cambodia was warning of rights violations in the context of economic land concessions (UN 
2007). Land in rural Cambodia was granted to private companies as economic land concessions, for 
the development of agro-industrial plantations. The majority were granted in favour of foreign 
business interests or prominent political and business figures. The rights violations documented in 
the report include the ‘lack of consultation with local communities, encroachment on land and 
detrimental impacts on traditional livelihoods, displacement, adverse environmental impacts, 
employment and labour conditions, violence and intimidation, and lack of effective remedy or 
recourse for affected communities.’ (UN 2007 p. 12). The report also mentions raising concerns 
about the impacts of economic land concessions on communities and NGOs which have faced 
restrictions on freedoms of movement and assembly, and pressure from companies and local 
authorities. 
 
Over the years, large portions of Cambodia’s territory (about 2.6 million hectares) were granted to 
domestic and foreign investors for the purposes of agricultural development, hydropower 
development, and economic forest concessions. While these land acquisition deals have yielded 
positive impacts on economic growth and rural employment over the last decade, and are expected 
to continue over the next decade, land deals for commercial agriculture and other development 
have also caused adverse impacts on livelihoods of disposed small holder farmers, forest-dependent 
communities, biodiversity and forests in Cambodia.  
 
In 2012, a report suggested that around 700,000 people had been negatively affected by these 
concessions (ADHOC, 2014). This has provoked a strong reaction by the affected people in an effort 
to reclaim their land and other related natural resources. With support of NGO programmes on 
rights to natural resources and livelihoods, protests aim at the concerned institutions, including the 
ministries of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, land management, urban planning and construction, 
the national assembly, and council of ministers, had become a regular occurrence in Phnom Penh 
and provincial centres prior the measures introduced to close civic space. Social movements and 
other ‘unruly’ forms of resistance to large-scale land deals became more prominent in Cambodia; 
this is in line with a more global focus on the problem of land-grabs in the wake of the food, fuel and 
financial crises of 2008 (Borras et al. 2011). A combination of local resistance with trans-local and 
transnational activists has been prominent in some of the many ongoing natural resource-related 
struggles in the country. In some instances, this civic action has succeeded in slowing or amending 
the terms of state-sponsored land deals (Young, 2016).  
 
As a result of civic activism drawing attention to the associated human rights violations and negative 
environmental impacts, the Cambodian government has become more careful about the issue of 
land-grabbing since 2013, and taken measures to reduce land grabs. While land grabs have still 
occurred over the past few years, they appear fewer and smaller-scale. Among the leading land 
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protesters, Tep Vanny and her colleagues who have persistently protested against land 
expropriation in Boeung Kak Lake, were often arrested and charged on spurious grounds. After the 
elections 2013, the situation tightened and she and her colleague were arrested and imprisoned 
again for more than two years, from 2016 to August 2018 (Voun, 2018), only being released dafter 
the general election had been held in July 2018. This may be read as a signal that the government is 
trying to reduce tensions, after the ruling party managed to win a landslide victory in the latest 
election.  
 
Labour rights 
Readymade garments are the country’s single largest export sector, accounting for 70 per cent of 
total exports, bringing in over USD 6 billion annually in recent years. Labour rights in the textile 
sector are a major concern for social stability and social justice, and have been a prominent issue for 
civil society organisations. The widening of civic space of the 1990s and 2000s did not include labour 
rights, nor were these areas in which aid donors focused their attention (Hughes 2007). Workers’ 
freedom of association and assembly are, however, likely to have an important impact on their 
wages, working conditions, and safety at work (Oka 2016; Evans 2017). A recent analysis suggested 
that a ‘living wage’ for Cambodian garments workers could be more than three times the prevailing 
minimum wage, and that local labour mobilization would likely concentrate instead on the more 
realistic achievement of the local minimum wage (Ford and Gillan 2017). Yet while the 1997 Labour 
Code guarantees freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike 
(Nuon and Serrano 2010), labour organization has remained proscribed, both formally and 
informally; working conditions remain poor (Human Rights Watch 2015a). 
 
The majority of factory owners are Chinese and Korean companies, but Japanese and Western 
companies also operate garments factories in Cambodia. The working conditions in Chinese 
companies tend to be poor compared to those in other firms; there tend to be fewer protests in 
companies where working conditions and wages are better, including where factories have buyers 
for international brands who are required to comply with labour codes of conduct. In September 
2014, after negotiations with trade unions, global fashion brands such as Primark, Inditex (‘Zara’), 
H&M, C&A, and Next took action and agreed they would pay a minimum wage of USD 177 per 
month in their Cambodian supply chains (Bloomer and Sta. Maria 2015). Nevertheless, as reported 
by Human Rights Watch (2015), many international brands have yet to live up to their 
responsibilities and address poor supply chain transparency, failing to help local factory owners to 
correct problems in situations where that is both possible and warranted. Some brands continue to 
remain non-transparent about their policies and practices, withholding information on issues of 
concern, including labour conditions. NGOs have been involved in reporting labour rights violations 
and other issues to the Ministry of Labour and organizing stakeholder forums with workers. 
However, the Ministry of Labour has only limited ability to respond, and has limited leverage in 
practice to influence what is happening in the factories. 
 
Before 2016, the unions in Cambodia appeared to enjoy a certain amount of freedom in expressing 
their concerns over wage and working conditions of workers in various sectors. There are two types 
of unions, independent and quasi-government unions. The latter are often created to support 
Government policies and employers. Independent unions, to a certain degree, represent the 
interests of the workers. As such, the government has two different measures to control the unions. 
During the drafting of the Trade Union Law, unions consulted with other lawyer associations and 
NGOs. However, inputs or comments from participants NGOs, associations and other stakeholders 
were not well incorporated in the law, and some of its provisions contradict ILO conventions which 
had been ratified by the government.  
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In 2016, the Trade Union Law was passed by the National Assembly, and has bestowed authority on 
the Royal Government of Cambodia to enforce the provisions. Although there are some provisions 
on protections of freedom of associations and unions, the law also restricts unions, especially 
garment workers in the Phnom Penh area and the neighbouring provinces, from advocating for their 
rights and improved working conditions. According to the Law, all types of unions, even those at the 
factory level, often known as on-site or factory-based unions, are required to register officially. This 
is a difficult and complex task with strict requirements. One of the labour rights activists interviewed 
for this report asserted that if they did not align with the government policies or factory’s owner-
based unions, they would not receive registration. More outspoken unions tend to experience 
repression from the Government. The recent wage rises have encouraged unions and workers to 
perceive official regulation of labour organizations as business-as-usual in the run-up to the elections 
in 2018. There is, however, no concerted action undertaken by unions and civil society, as they do 
not trust each other, to improve working conditions and workers’ wage. Interviewees reported that 
a number of unions have been established and supported by government officials, and support 
government policies. 
 
Media freedom 
The current political settlement in Cambodia is characterised by attacks on media, journalism and all 
forms of critical reporting in print media and radio. The most prominent recent development on the 
Cambodian independent media space has been the closure of The Cambodia Daily newspaper. After 
24 years the newspaper was forced to close and cease publication on September 4, 2017. The 
closing down of The Cambodia Daily is an example of how tax regulation has been misused to silence 
independent journalism and critical media reporting. The newspaper reported it was facing 
imminent threats of closure and legal action by the tax department over a disputed $6.3 million tax 
bill (The Cambodia Daily, 2017).  
 
With the closure of The Cambodia Daily an important independent media voice was lost. As one 
interviewee stated:  
 
The government equates independent media opinions and criticisms with dissent and tries to 
stamp them out ... the Rule of Law is being used to eliminate dissent and issues around 
taxation continue to be used to close down critical organisations. 
 
The reporting of the other remaining independent newspaper, the Phnom Penh Post, has been 
regarded less of a challenge to the political settlement, compared to the Cambodia Daily. The Post 
still has some limited influence on public opinion, as no other media organisation and newspaper is 
writing about issues such as corruption, protests over land grabbing or political reform. The latter 
were covered by the Post, but became less frequent given a recent threat to the Post pertaining tax 
issue, similar to the accusations against the Cambodia Daily. In May 2018, the Post was sold to a 
Malaysia based businessman believed to have strong ties to Hun Sen (Mooney and Baydas 2018); 
the tax issue appears to no longer be as concern, as the chief of editor was fired when he revealed 
that the Post had changed owner.  
 
Protests over land grabbing have not stopped, but due to government restrictions on the right of 
assembly, the protests have become smaller and less visible, as both people and community-based 
organisations are scared of government repercussions and crack-downs. The many local newspapers 
across the countries, including but not limited to Fresh New, Kohsantepheap Daily, Reaksmey 
Kampuchea and Thmey Thmey, are either too intimidated to report on sensitive issues or oppose 
the government. Fresh News has been an active mouth piece of the government. If issues of land 
grabbing and worker protests are not reported in local news, it also does not make it into national 
news, and is even less likely to reach the international media. In late 2017 five independent radio 
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stations were also closed, including Radio Free Asia2 which used to broadcast on garment workers 
issues and labour rights. Some of the former radio station, such VoD (Voice of Democracy) and RFA 
have resorted mainly to online radio and Facebook based broadcasting. The RFA’s former journalists 
were captured alleging of espionage producing news and information to the foreign countries 
although they were released after the July general elections (Khouth and Soth, 2018). The overall 
political situation makes journalism difficult: reporters feel intimidated by security forces, and there 
have been reports that journalists have been imprisoned and attacked by security forces when 
reporting, for example, on protests of garment workers.  
 
Restriction of media freedom and access to information is also an issue for rural areas. The 
shutdown of independent radio stations has particularly impacted access to information in rural 
areas where illiteracy levels are still high; people depend on radio stations for information, and these 
are now mostly run by the state. According to interviewees, there is limited access to the Internet in 
rural areas, so social media campaigns do not reach rural populations, and low literacy limits use of 
smartphones. Since independent radio stations were closed, the mainstream media only reports 
official stories, and avoids critical reporting. With independent media being shut down, the 
international media now has a major role in reporting events in the country, independent from 
official narratives, but they are less accessible to ordinary Cambodians.  
 
The Draft Access to Information Law, a potentially important new law relevant for the future of the 
media, and a possible mechanism with which to tackle corruption, is expected to be enacted in the 
second half of 2018, after the national election. This law is expected to impact on how independent 
media organisations can operate in Cambodia. It will complement the Press Law which only provides 
limited space for journalists to demand information as a matter of law. During the drafting of the 
law, CSOs and media organisations were able to join government officials as technical partner and 
provide inputs to the draft law. The technical working group provided significant amounts of content 
into the draft law (e.g. Article 20 on confidential information, includes public order, privacy, national 
economy, security of society, initially only included very vague and general description), so that 
Article 20 cannot be used as pretext to not disclose information. The Government accepted inputs 
from civil society and the current draft has been accepted by most of the country’s independent 
media organisations and CSOs. Rights-based organisations in Cambodia have been campaigning for a 
freedom of information law since the early 2000s and this new draft law can provide possible new 
space for civil society. If passed and enforced, the proposed legislation means that public officials 
will be required to release budget documents, spending records, draft laws, meeting minutes and 
any other type of recorded information to the public upon request, with ostensibly limited 
exceptions (Chen 2018). 
 
 
Impact of shrinking space on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
 
A key general finding of the case study concerns the government’s low commitment to achieving the 
SDGs. All interviewees expressed their concern about the government’s lack of commitment and 
limited ability to deliver effective implementation of programmes to achieve SDGs. According to 
Open Development Cambodia (ODC 2018), of the 169 SDG targets only 109 targets are considered 
relevant by the Cambodian government. Of these only 85 targets (78 per cent) are already being 
addressed by national strategic planning processes and policies; 17 targets are being only partially 
addressed and a further 7 are not addressed at all. So far, there are no clear sub-indicators relating 
to SDG targets defined by the government, and comments from civil society organisations on SDG 
                                                     
2 https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia. 
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implementation have not been well incorporated into government strategy. Although some 
legislation includes reference to the SDGs and a number of technical working groups have been 
established, the common perception is that SDGs are not a priority for the government. The Ministry 
of Planning coordinates the country’s SDG work and coordinates all other ministries and 
stakeholders. One of the main challenges is lack of baseline data and work on meaningful indicators 
to measure progress towards achieving SDG targets, in which civil society actors, including 
researchers and think tanks, are generally expected to play an important role. There is a potential 
contradiction that NGOs are expected to contribute to SDG implementation and planning, yet are 
restricted in their specific activities due to closing civic space.   
 
SDG 2: Zero hunger: food production, small scale agriculture  
SDG 2 is a goal where a number of conflicting objectives interact – in particular smallholder land 
rights vs commercial land concessions, rural livelihoods vs modernisation of large-scale agricultural 
production in the Cambodian contexts. The Cambodian government is increasingly aware of the 
issue of food security, which has come to the fore as a result of commodity price volatility in the 
uncertain economic climate. The official development strategy is to ensure food security through 
large-scale investments in agriculture and giving land concessions to agri-business. However, many 
small-scale farmers are being left behind in the push towards large-scale agriculture with no market 
access and lack of ability organise. Some 64 percent of the population is still employed in agriculture, 
and 51 percent of the agricultural labour force is female, yet the sector has barely grown in the last 
decade (Navarro 2016). 
 
This development prioritising large-scale agri-business is in direct conflict with SDG 2 Target 2.3 ‘By 
2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular 
women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and 
equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets 
and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment’. Rural dispossession as a result of 
large-scale land-grabbing and/or land deals has led to impoverishment and displacement among 
large marginalized groups, including indigenous and minority communities from resource-rich areas. 
According to Welthungerhilfe (n.d.), one in every five households in Cambodia no longer has any 
land of its own from which people could live off its harvests, which counteracts efforts to achieve 
Target 2.1 ‘By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in 
vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round. This 
situation is predicted to worsen, and small holder farmers will face a land shortage in the coming 
years. By 2030, the amount of land required to sustain Cambodia’s smallholder farmer population 
will need to increase by anywhere from 10 to 64 per cent of 2015 levels, or 320,600 to 1.96 million 
hectares (Davies 2016). 
 
According to interviewees, NGOs try to link their activities and projects to targets of SDG 2. As ‘land 
rights’ cannot be an official topic for NGO activities in the current political settlement, many NGOs 
have started working on food security and poverty reduction. This stands in contrast with the trend 
of NGO participation and contribution to development in the past. After the Paris Peace Agreement 
in 1991, many domestic NGOs were established and international ones came to Cambodia and they 
employed service delivery approaches in various sectors, including agriculture, rural development, 
reproductive and public health, sanitation, credit and saving, and sustainable management of forest 
and other common resources. After 2005, some NGOs adopted rights-based and advocacy 
approaches to address the influence of neo-liberalisation policies adopted by the state (privatization 
of common and public resources, of which economic land concession scheme is an example). Many 
NGOs supported community-based organizations to build their capacity to demand or advocate for 
their livelihoods or resource rights. Since the 2013 elections, these NGOs have been monitored and 
harassed as the Government tries to suppress NGO advocacy. Especially since the 2017 elections and 
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dissolution, many NGOs have kept a much lower profile and the NGOs’ approach has softened, 
appearing to cope with the current political situations. An interview revealed that: 
 
NGOs have now changed their approach, and (are) adapting to the current political situation. 
We are not able to do business as usual. We are now playing around our reports or wording. 
We cannot put the [advocacy, campaign, governance, human rights, democracy, freedom of 
expression] title [of workshops or reports] as we used to. We changed the terms or words 
from advocacy to development, or learning forum. This would help cope with the situation 
and leverage the effectiveness of the NGOs’ contribution to development. 
 
A recent record of NGO fund has revealed that grants for advocacy, governance, human rights, 
democracy and empowerment has declined. In 2018, CDC report suggests that out of 370 NGOs, 25 
large NGOs, which are mainly categorised as service delivery, including rural development, public 
health, education and agriculture contribute, absorbed 56 percent (US$118 million) of all funds to 
NGOs in 2017 (US$211.3 million). These largest service delivery NGOs include Foundation Children’s 
Hospital Khanth Bopha, World Vision Cambodia, Save the Children International and Plan 
International (CDC 2018). The large NGOs working on right based approach, advocacy, governance 
and human rights, such as Action Aid International Cambodia and the Asia Foundation, which were 
enlisted in 2011 as a largest NGO fund (CDC 2011), are now not among the largest NGOs, according 
to funds received. USAID which is known as one of the leading agencies providing funds to NGOs 
working on human rights and democratic issues had its budget cut (BBC, 2018) under the President 
Trump administration. This suggests that space for advocacy, rights-based approaches, human rights 
and empowerment has been limited, and service delivery has re-emerged as the primary role of civil 
society (this also happened in 1993, after the first elections were held). 
 
There is potential to increase farmers’ incomes through a shift from lower-value rice paddy 
cultivation to growing higher-value vegetable crops. Interviewees reported that smallholder farmers’ 
incomes can increase by up to 50 percent from this shift in crop cultivation. NGO activities which 
increase farmers’ incomes directly relate to Target 2.3 ‘By 2030, double the agricultural productivity 
and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, 
pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive 
resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and 
non-farm employment’. A number of NGOs are beginning to start programming on improving 
productivity and providing market access space for smallholders. Capacity building and organising 
smallholder farmers in agricultural cooperatives can more consistently yield good quality and 
quantity of crop outcomes, providing food security and livelihoods. The production of organic rice as 
high-value crop is a major strategy to improve livelihoods.  
 
There is an important role for socially-oriented businesses for achieving better food security and 
increasing smallholder farmer incomes. Partnering with social enterprises has provided capacity 
building for smallholder farmers to increase agricultural output and market access. According to 
interviews with business representatives, so far the changing political settlement and shrinking 
space of civil society has not negatively impacted on agricultural businesses working with 
smallholders and cooperatives. Some new challenges have nevertheless emerged. One of the 
interviewees stated that the restriction on group gatherings poses a new problem as it is hindering 
recruitment efforts and the work of cooperatives. Furthermore, the government needs to be 
informed about commercial activities, especially if funding from international organisations which is 
channelled through Government agencies is concerned. For instance, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) provides funding to social enterprises working in the agricultural 
sector through the Cambodian Ministry of Agriculture. USAID has also provided funding for work 
with smallholder farmers. While there is at this point no indication that funding for these projects 
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will stop, project results are likely to be impacted by restrictions in terms of meetings, weakening of 
the rule of law and low levels of trust.  
 
SDG 5: Gender (in)equality: ending gender discrimination, women’s participation in community-
based organizations, land title issues, safety of women in cities 
A number of gender gaps exist in Cambodia, such as the decent wage gap, human capital gap and 
social protection gap, all of which restrict and hamper progress on development and achieving SDG 
5. Considering SDG 5.1 ‘End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere’, 
NGOs have contributed significantly towards ending discrimination in the past and shrinking civic 
space limiting NGO work will have negative impact on ending discrimination, potentially even 
leading to increasing discrimination. NGOs’ contribution has been achieved through removing 
cultural, social, and institutional obstacles by educating the public about gender issues and 
improving women’s capabilities and access to economic opportunities. In terms of gender and 
health, NGOs also support women to gain access to better health services and to reduce family 
health expenditure through upgraded health centres and public health services contracted to NGOs, 
thereby contributing to Target 5.6 ‘Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and 
reproductive rights.’  
 
Regarding Target 5.5 ‘Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for 
leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life’, much work remains 
to be done. According the Cambodia Country Gender Analysis for Cambodia (ADB 2012), the country 
has been off track in the MDG period achieving gender targets relating to political leadership, such 
as female proportion of ministers or provincial governors. Although the ratio of female civil servants 
slightly increased from 21 percent in 2011 to 26 percent in 2016 (Khmer Times, 2017), the gender 
gap remains quite significant.  
 
Target 5.4 ‘Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public 
services, infrastructure and social protection policies, and the promotion of shared responsibility 
within the household and the family as nationally appropriate’ is highly relevant for the Cambodian 
context. Indicators that focused on formal employment only previously ignored the high proportion 
of Cambodian women in informal self-employment, largely as a result of their unpaid care work 
responsibilities. Furthermore, NGOs contributed to women’s development in the formal economy in 
the MDG implementation period, either through cooperation with the government on Women 
Development Centres, implementing training programmes and provision of information on jobs, and 
access to credit. Based on the past contributions of NGOs to women’s development, expanding the 
role of NGOs and civil society for women development was explicitly recommended by the joint 
report of the Cambodian Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the UN in 2013 (UNDP 2013). 
 
In contrast to the recommendations by the UN, interviewees reported that women’s rights groups 
are affected as much as any other civil society organization by shrinking space and low respect for 
human rights and gender by the Cambodian Government. There are large numbers of community-
based organizations established by both non-profit organisations and Government institutions, 
many in relation to agricultural sectors and community development. In the fishery sector, while 
gender is not specifically mentioned in the law and related sub-decrees, women are encouraged to 
be part of the management committee of community fisheries; the same is true of community forest 
committees. Cambodian women tend to be more prominent participants in community-based 
development work than men, who have often migrated away to do other work or are away from the 
village cultivating rice. While women’s participation in community meetings is numerically 
impressive, their participation in decision-making remains weak. The women’s movement and 
associated civil society organizations and NGOs have played an important role in promoting 
women’s empowerment and leadership capacities for community development, and restrictions on 
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organizations working on women’s rights will have an adverse effect on women’s participation and 
gender equality over time.  
 
Civic space and the work of NGOs has been crucial to provide more equal rights to economic 
resources. In the SDG context this is capture by target 5A ‘Undertake reforms to give women equal 
rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of 
property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws.’ As 
observed over the last decade, women with the support of NGOs have been particularly active in 
land titling and land ownership issues. Protests have been observed not only in the rural but also in 
urban areas where women have often been at the forefront of demonstrations. In the urban areas, 
especially Boeung Kak Lake and Borey Keila communities, women are considered a symbol of 
peaceful and non-violent protest in demanding and claiming restitution of their land from large-scale 
development or real estate projects. Although men’s names are often written first in the official land 
title, many more women also now have their names on official land titles. While these types of 
women’s association and grassroots activism have produced fruitful results, the Government has 
demanded that they register officially according to the LANGO. This is going to dampen activism and 
spontaneous protests and divide social movements, with negative impacts on achieving gender 
equality outcomes. 
 
In Cambodian cities, personal safety remains a critical issue for vulnerable groups, in particular 
women factory workers. While there is a direct link to Target 16.1 ‘Significantly reduce all forms of 
violence and related death rates everywhere’, absence of security and increasing violence affects 
development outcomes across the board, including economic growth. At the country level, the 
socio-economic survey 2015 suggested that there was no significant difference regarding feeling 
safety (from crime and domestic violence) between households headed by men and those headed 
by women (Ministry of Planning 2015). However, the share of women among the victims of violence 
was high, at 56 per cent comparing to 44 per cent of men. Women are also vulnerable in rural areas 
as a Phnom Penh informant commented: 
 
Safety of the children or adult women is an issue in Phnom Penh, and even in the rural areas. 
In Phnom Penh, most of the workers are on night shifts, and a number of them attend a part-
time school and training at night too. They leave home after or around 8pm, and it is very 
difficult for them because there is no proper street lighting. A lot crime, such as pickpockets, 
robbing, raping, and other harassment happened to women at night. 
 
Interviewees reported that female NGO staff are affected too. Some NGOs working on women 
safety and women workers have also started taking some precaution measures. However, the level 
of support such as awareness raising on their safety, violence and harassment prevention to women 
workers, has been limited. 
 
SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth  
The Target 8.1 ‘Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, 
in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed 
countries’ appears to be one of the major objectives of the Cambodian government. Cambodia has 
enjoyed a rapid, if somewhat volatile, rate of economic growth in the past two decades, largely due 
to the expansion of the workforce into low-skilled urban wage work in the garments industry and 
through rising agricultural commodity prices. However, labour productivity gains have been slow, 
and Cambodia remains trapped towards the bottom of global value chains in commodities and 
manufactured exports (World Bank 2017).  
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Without substantial investments in agricultural development and skills and human capital, it is not 
clear that the pace of growth can be maintained. Furthermore, achieving target 8.2 ‘Achieve higher 
levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, 
including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors’ will require changes in 
the country’s economic development strategy which is creating rising inequality, exclusion, and 
environmental degradation. The role of civil society actors in advocating and holding Government 
and the private sector to account for policies of sustainable, inclusive and equitable models of 
development that ‘leave no one behind’ would be highly relevant in this context. For instance, as 
described above, NGOs, independent media and lawyers were instrumental in holding the 
government to account over land grabbing in the past. In a continued closed civic space situation 
after the August 2018 elections, this will not be possible. While sustainable economic growth is in 
general endangered by the weakness of Cambodian institutions of governance (Hill and Menon 
2013), there are several specific pathways through which restriction on civic space would impact on 
the nature and pace of economic growth and decent work.  
  
The formal regulatory system for doing business remains a major obstacle to investment and 
economic growth. The country ranks towards the bottom of countries in the region in terms of 
indicators such as starting and registering a business, tax payments, and infrastructure (World Bank 
2018). Corruption makes it difficult to do business in a legal and transparent way: bribery is rife 
across all sectors in the economy, to the extent that some multinationals will not invest in 
Cambodia. This leaves more space for actors for whom corruption is not a concern, a category which 
includes some Chinese businesses. Companies with international transparency codes of conduct 
adhering to high international standards and principles cannot bribe, and so find regulatory 
processes take longer. A summary conclusion from the interviews is that recent developments with 
respect to civic space do not impact directly on business, unless the company in question speaks out 
against the government, or becomes involved in political discussions. However, from what we know 
of the role of the media and other civil society actors in relation to demanding transparency and 
accountability and combating corruption, restrictions on media freedom and rights-based activism 
are likely to weaken, rather than to strengthen, efforts to tackle corruption in business regulation. 
This means that over time, the space in which law-abiding business actors can invest profitably in 
Cambodia is unlikely to increase as a result, and may shrink further, as they are forced to compete 
on an uneven playing field with businesses that are not so constrained by anti-corruption rules and 
procedures.  
 
Second, as diagnostic studies have shown, Cambodia’s continued growth and development depends 
on moving up global value chains, through higher labour productivity, which in turn demands 
greater investment in human capital, in particular through improving health, education and nutrition 
services, and in particular for the poorest people. Civil society has played an important role in 
complementing and supporting public service delivery in the past. In 2011, civil society organisations 
claimed approximately 2.8 to 4.5 million Cambodians directly benefited from their activities (CCC 
2012). According to Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC)’s 2018 report, NGOs managed 
to raise funds from around US$ 231 million (2014) to US$250 million (2016), which is approximately 
16 percent of the total grant aid in 2017. Closing civic space may prevent NGOs from continuing to 
deliver services in the future as funding, mostly from Western donors, is being restricted. Compared 
to 2016, NGO funding declined in 2017, raising about US$ 211.3 million (CDC, 2018). However, CSO 
action is likely to be limited by the extent to which it ‘goes with the political grain’, rather than 
challenging or scrutinizing the Government. This is likely to limit the scope for amplifying the voice of 
marginalized and disempowered groups in the society; silence critics of inequitable or corrupt public 
services; and reduce competitive pressures on incumbent governments to improve service delivery 
performance for electoral success. The high-quality public services needed to keep Cambodia on a 
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sustainable growth path are unlikely to emerge under conditions of closing civic space and media 
restrictions.  
 
Third, other targets under SDG 8 are also likely to be affected by how closing civic space shapes the 
environment for economic growth, in particular labour rights in Cambodia’s garment sector. Target 
8.8 aims to ‘Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, 
including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment’. It 
should be noted issues of labour rights are also issues of gender equality in the Cambodian context, 
as some 85 per cent of garment workers are women (Arias-Vazquez et al 2014). In terms of garment 
workers’ rights, the main changes under the new political settlement in the pre-2018 election 
period, concern wages and freedom of expression. The Government acted on election promises and 
has taken some action to increase wages of garment workers as reaction to rises in inflation, to 
cover rising expenses for everyday living and support families. Yet, the annual increase in wage 
remains low in a context of inflation and high food prices. Even while the Government has raised 
wages, freedom of expression and workers’ rights such as freedom of assembly have become more 
restricted as a direct result of the new Trade Union Law. Female garment workers receive less 
support from unions, and unions are pressured by authorities which have restricted protest action. 
Previously, garment workers could protest and express their dissatisfaction with working conditions. 
In addition, the limited independent media space is also linked to limited worker rights. An 
informant claimed: 
 
Nowadays, the freedom of expression of unions and garment workers is now being 
restricted. We are not allowed to hold public meeting at the public place, and even the 
private venue. Even in Facebook, we can just post our face, but not to raise the concerns 
regarding working conditions and wage. The PM is now getting closer to the unions and 
garment workers through holding public meeting with the latter. This does not mean it is 
good, getting closer is the way of suppressing. 
 
 
SDG 10 and SDG 11: Inequalities of income, between rural and urban areas, and within cities and 
urban communities 
While growth was pro-poor in the first decade of the 2000s, and relative income inequalities have 
actually declined in Cambodia, the absolute gap between rich and poor has widened significantly, 
feeding a strong perception of growing differences between rich and poor (Arias-Vazquez et al 
2014). As shown above, inequality has impacted Cambodia’s development performance, as shown 
through the inequality-adjusted human development index. Cambodia’s human development index 
(HDI) for 2015 was 0.563, however, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 
0.436, a loss of 22.5 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices (UNDP 
2016). This perception of a growing income gap coupled with the vulnerability of the majority of 
those who have risen just above the poverty line, highlights the fragility of the social contract 
governing the distribution of the gains from economic development.  
 
The drivers of rural and urban income growth have differed widely: rural populations gained from 
rice price rises, increased paddy production, higher rural wages, and non-farm production, seeing 
rapid reductions in rural poverty between 2004 and 2009. By contrast, urban populations suffered 
from the rising rice price, and urban wage workers saw a decline in their consumption power. Urban 
wages have been rising, including in the all-important garments sector, as noted above, but in real 
terms, have been inadequate to meet rising living costs. Rural-urban income differentials are high, 
with the latest Cambodia socio-economic survey 2015 showing that rural household monthly 
incomes averaged 1.3m riels (about USD 330), compared to 2.9m (USD 734) in Phnom Penh and 
2.3m riels (about USD 562) in other urban areas (Ministry of Planning, 2015). 
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Inequality within cities is also being exacerbated due to fast real estate development. The World 
Bank estimates that by 2050 36 per cent Cambodia’s population will live in urban areas, up from 
about 21 per cent today; the World Bank also highlights the need for ensuring inclusive urbanization 
in Cambodian cities as urban inequality threatens sustainability and can lead to social divisions and 
conflict (Word Bank 2017b). This is particularly relevant in the context of SDG Target 11.1 ‘By 2030, 
ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.’ 
Over half the urban population lives in slums, and more inclusive urban development strategies are 
required. Yet some urban development projects and government funded projects have negatively 
impacted on communities. For instance, in 2014, about 4,000 people in the Boeung Kak community 
were coerced into accepting compensation for a fraction of the market value for their homes and 
land. NGOs played an important role in supporting families and the community to get land right 
titles in this case. 
 
One of the NGO staff interviewees for this report had worked on sustainable and inclusive 
urbanisation, including with communities in Phnom Penh resisting forced evictions from 
infrastructure and real estate development. This work involved public protests and media 
campaigns. Due to the recent restrictions on civil society, freedom of association and tightened 
media control, this type of advocacy work is not possible anymore. The closing of civic space is 
impacting on progress towards SDG Target 11.3 which emphasises the need for participation and 
integrated planning in urban development ‘By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization 
and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and 
management in all countries.’  
  
 
SDG 15: “Life on Land” – Civic space and forest conservation  
The particular issues in Cambodia relating to SDG 15 are the destructive impacts on forest and land 
resources through land grabbing, large-scale agricultural concessions and hydroelectric power dam 
construction. The SDG 15 ‘Life on Land’ links to Goal 7 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 
efforts to achieve the SDG Target 15.2 can be seen as a continuation of MDG 7 related activities. 
Under the MDGs, Cambodia had a specific target of maintaining forest cover of at least 60 per cent 
by 2015, however, this target was not met. According to data from a number of sources, by 2014 the 
total forest cover had fallen to 8.7 million hectares, from 13.1 million hectares of total forest in 
1973. For the first time in the 41-year period, the percentage of non-forest ground cover (48.4 per 
cent) was larger than that of forest cover (47.7 per cent) (ODC 2015, Hansen et al. 2013). Now in the 
SDG implementation period, the deforestation trend continues: in October 2017, new data showed 
that Cambodian forests were cleared in 2016 at a rate 30 percent higher than in 2015 (Seangly and 
Baliga 2017). Deforestation in 2016 was worse than 2015, but over the 16 years that deforestation 
has been measured in Cambodia, 2016’s loss of around 200,000 hectares was the fourth-worst year 
(ODC, 2016). Given this trend, achieving SDG 15 Target 15.2 ‘By 2020, promote the implementation 
of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and 
substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally’ will be a major challenge for 
Cambodia.  
 
There is evidence that forest loss is a direct outcome of large-scale economic land concessions (ELCs) 
and large-scale agricultural investment which were officially included in the 2001 Land Law of 
Cambodia. Since then, a large portion of Cambodia’s territory (about 2.6 million hectares) were 
granted to both domestic and foreign investors for the purposes of agricultural development, 
hydropower development, and economic forest concessions. The results of the interviews 
conducted confirm other research findings from the academic literature (e.g. Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014) 
which show that  
 
29 
 
land grabbing in Cambodia, particularly through economic land concessions (ELCs), is often 
associated with conflict and thus has serious implications for sustainable land management, 
including sustainable forest management (Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014, p. 205).  
 
In addition, there are numerous related issues including ambiguous property rights and overlapping 
claims on land titles, lack of coordination among government agencies, and lack of consultation and 
impact assessment prior to the decision-making process are the underlying causes of conflict around 
deforestation. 
 
Although ELCs were suspended in 2012 by a sub-decree, deforestation has not decreased since then 
and many of the conflicts that resulted from the ELCs have yet to be resolved. The more recent 
deforestation incidences are caused by illegal logging activities. A report by the International Union 
of Forest Research Organisations (IUFRO) found that 90 per cent of logging activities in Cambodia 
are illegal (Kleinschmit et al. 2016), an assessment supported by one of our interviewees:  
 
Although the government officially has checks and balances in place to ensure no primary 
forest is being logged, the government lacks expertise and political will for effective forest 
protection. Moreover, there is too much illegal money floating around to prevent illegal 
logging. 
 
International and local NGOs have played important roles for sustainable forest management in 
Cambodia. First, as watchdogs to document and report on illegal logging activities and the resulting 
conflicts between local communities and companies: NGOs coordinated national level advocacy on 
forestry issues has been successful in gaining momentum on shedding light on the problems that 
concessions were presenting for local communities (CCC, 2010). For instance, the analysis of the 
NGO Forum on Cambodia (2010) found that the majority of large-scale land and logging conflicts 
usually involved a dispute between forest-dependent communities and companies with economic 
land concessions. Furthermore, many NGOs working with local forest-based communities applied 
rights-based approaches and organised protests against large-scale development projects, thereby 
protecting forests and forest-based livelihoods. NGOs also act as mediators in conflicts between 
villagers and logging companies, reducing conflicts and confrontation between different stakeholder 
groups.  
 
Possibly most importantly, NGOs have played a vital role in setting up community forests as an 
approach to managing forests and recognising local communities’ rights to forest resources. While 
supported by substantial governmental legislation, most of Cambodia’s community forests were 
initiated and promoted mainly by various national and international NGOs as well as donor agencies 
to achieve sustainable management of forest resources and support forest-based livelihoods. 
According to Dhiaulhaq et al. (2014) from 1990 to 2004, initially about 150 community forest units 
were established in 15 provinces. This number gradually increased, by 2012 totalling 227 community 
forests with formally signed agreements (covering 182 354 ha) and at least 250 were in 
developmental stages. The CFs are considered vital to forest-dependent communities as a source of 
timber and non-timber forest products. NGOs working on the development of community forests 
have contributed directly to Target 15b ‘Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all 
levels to finance sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing 
countries to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation.’  
 
NGOs have also been important actors in implementing national forest protection plans. Numerous 
partnerships developed over the years Cambodia between national and local authorities and NGOs, 
aiming to strengthen forest protection. The plans and structures for protected forest areas 
increasingly involve NGOs for implementation. The area under protection has grown significantly in 
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recent years, especially in 2016 when the Ministry of the Environment designated 1 million hectares 
of new protected areas, much of that around the Prey Lang forest area (Eng, 2016).  
 
However, the future of the role of NGOs’ in forest protection remains uncertain in the current 
political settlement. If civil society space becomes further restricted and international aid decreases 
in the future, local NGOs would be greatly affected, and so would forest protection, with negative 
effects for SDG 15. Some evidence suggests that if local NGOs are not present on the ground and 
actively engaged in community forest protection and management, logging activities of rosewood 
and other luxury hardwoods takes place, often involving indebted local villagers (The Straight Times 
2018). As noted above, foreign direct investment in Cambodia’s mining sector and extractive 
industries in 2018 is expected to reach $1.3 billion (Vannak, 2018) with the goal to further boost 
economic growth (SDG Target 8.1) and there are obvious goals conflicts with SDG 15. Other recent 
limitations on civic freedoms including restrictions on freedom of assembly and closing down of 
independent media has negative impacts on sustainable forest management, with negative 
outcomes for SDG 15.  
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4. Conclusions and implications 
 
Key findings and implications 
The current situation in Cambodia and the closing of civil society space is one of rapid change, 
closely linked to the country’s changing political settlement since the 2013 elections. The ruling 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) cracked down on the opposition, independent media, arresting key 
political figures, activists and members of civil society. Despite these measures the main opposition, 
the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) made strong gains in the 2017 commune elections, 
gaining 44 per cent of the popular vote. Since then, a further crackdown on the opposition has also 
impacted on civil society including NGOs, unions, independent media organizations and community-
based organizations, which the Government considers to be aligned with the political opposition. 
Donors and the international community, with the exception of China, have pledged to withdraw or 
suspend their funding in protest at the restrictions on civic and political space. In the run-up to 
Cambodia’s general election in July 2018, further restrictions on civic space were observed. At the 
time of writing shortly after the election, it is not known how civil society space will develop. 
However, under the current political settlement it does not seem likely that spaces will re-open.  
 
While measures have been discussed among major international players, in particular Western aid 
donors and the international community, to reinstate the status quo, these have to date yielded no 
results: Government leaders appear uncommitted to the SDGs, and unconcerned about the 
threatened loss of international aid in a context in which Chinese aid has supported infrastructure, 
roads, large-scale agriculture and poverty reduction. Interviewees reported that NGOs have adjusted 
to cope within the current political settlement and shrinking space, in a general move away from an 
advocacy and rights-based approach to a more service delivery approach to development 
cooperation. CSOs advocating for civic freedoms contributed to more equal and sustainable 
development pathways in the past, especially addressing the needs of vulnerable rural communities, 
protecting rights of marginalised groups as well as forest protection. An important conclusion from 
the case study is that Cambodia’s reform path is now threatened; although economic development 
and growth will continue under the political settlement, the pressure on people indicates the 
government risks social unrest and potential uprisings, if freedoms are restricted further. 
 
As discussed above, the shrinking space of civil society has already had negative impacts on 
development outcomes and is very likely to have negative outcomes for a number of the human 
development SDGs, including those relating to food security (SDG 2), gender and inequality (SDG 5 
and SDG 10), quality of work and workers’ rights (SDG 8). Further negative impacts can also be 
expected for Life on Land (SDG 15). Economic actors have mostly been unaffected by the recent 
shrinking of civil society space. However, international investors are becoming cautious, due to 
potential political instability and increased risk. As interviewees stated, many opportunistic investors 
especially from China and neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, are moving to Cambodia. As 
estimated by IMF, economic growth is expected to be as high as in previous years, at about 7 per 
cent in the current financial year; however, the distribution of the benefits can be expected to be 
highly unequal. 
 
At first glance, the progress towards the SDGs relating to economic growth (SDG 8) and 
infrastructure (SDG 9) does not appear to be impacted by the changes in the political situation and 
shrinking civic space. The IMF has identified investment in infrastructure as the key aspect to sustain 
stable growth. As a matter of policy, the Cambodian government also encourages investment in 
agriculture, which accounted for about 27 per cent of GDP in 2016, and diversification of agricultural 
products, which will support economic growth and achieving targets of SDGs 8 and 9. However, 
looking more closely, under SDG 8 there are several specific targets such as Target 8.5 ‘By 2030, 
achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for 
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young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value’ and Target 8.8 
‘Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including 
migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment’. In view of the 
restrictions on labour union activities and other obstructive legislations as described above, it seems 
unlikely that positive progress on these important targets can be achieved. Thus, negative impacts 
and trade-offs can be expected for targets of SDG 10 if decent work targets under SDG 8 are not 
explicitly considered and addressed.  
 
Gaps and limitations 
This study provides insights into the link between closing civic space and development outcomes in 
Cambodia, however, there are a number of limitations to the research. The study depends on 
secondary literature sources and a small number of interviews with key informants from Phnom 
Penh. The security situation meant it was impossible to conduct interviews outside the capital or 
conduct workshops with a larger group of stakeholders, including government officials and 
investors. Furthermore, given the resources available, in-depth sector specific research and 
development of case studies was not possible. To be able to generate more in-depth insights more 
in-depth work with selected NGOs and CSOs is necessary, and would be of vital importance to 
understanding regional differences in development. Within the scope of this study it has not been 
possible to establish clear quantitative evidence about how closing civic space and restrictions on 
NGO activities has impacted livelihoods. The lack of data to report on specific indicators would 
require significant statistical work and household surveys to be able to quantify livelihood impacts.  
 
The study was also conducted in a turbulent political period when many informants and those of 
NGOs were reserved and cautious compared to the time before the 2013 elections. Given time and 
budget limitation, our interviews were conducted among some selected NGOs based in Phnom 
Penh. This research should have covered not only those in Phnom Penh, but also in the provinces to 
collate their different opinions. Voices from the government and its relevant institutions should be 
consulted and compared. The emphasis of future research should be on donors’ landscape and 
agendas during the pressing time, and the roles and forms of Chinese aid to Cambodia, and the 
implications for civil society space also warrant further exploration.  
 
Implications for policy and practice 
The findings of the study show that there is need for a more global political understanding of 
changing civic spaces. Some of the implications for international donors include the need for new 
approaches to address the problem of closing civic space. Donors need to recognize changing nature 
of public space, not all of it is very civic, some of it is becoming virtual, much of it unruly; aid donors 
have to think carefully about what they support. In particular, human rights-based and advocacy 
activities are becoming increasingly difficult, but are important to ensure negative impacts of 
development and investments on vulnerable and marginalised groups. Alternative approaches in 
which NGOs are involved in, such as social service provision supporting public services or social 
enterprise development have potential to continue to improve livelihoods. What is less clear at this 
point, is whether purely service delivery-focused approaches can to help to empower marginalized 
communities to voice their concerns to the government. 
 
In the specific case of Cambodia, the rising of role of China as a global political economy player 
appears to have strong implication for civil society space in the hybrid-democracy like Cambodia. 
The financial support of this authoritarian type of regime to the hybrid one does not promote and 
reinvigorate the recipient’s democracy, freedom of speech and expression, human rights and 
empowerment of those marginalised communities. This appears to be the case of Cambodia in this 
study. Responding to the influence of China in Cambodia, and mainland Southeast Asia, the western 
donors have to design their long-term engagement strategies to educate and to economically 
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empower the grassroots communities of labour rights, wages, land and natural resources-based 
economic rights. 
 
Ultimately, civil society has played a significant but contentious role in combating the tendencies of 
the Cambodian regime to promote rapid economic growth at all costs, often accompanied by non-
transparency and corrupt practices, to ameliorate some of the failures of the country’s weak 
institutions and public service delivery. The concern for the achievement of the SDGs is in part that 
without the demands for accountability generated by an open and vibrant civil society, Cambodia 
may not succeed in delivering the kinds of public services needed to nourish, education and care for 
its population and labour force. If the country cannot rise up global value chains, growth rates may 
well decline, as the labour force reaches its limits. External and internal pressures on the 
Government continue to push it in a broadly pro-poor direction, but they do so to the extent that 
these ‘go with the [political] grain’ of state policy. There are few signs that, faced with new political 
competition and critique from civil society and the media, the Government has any incentives to 
establish institutions or practices of accountability; there are therefore few safeguards that policies 
will seek to pursue development on a basis of equity, inclusiveness and sustainability. This can be 
seen in the pathways through which civic space closures are beginning to show signs of impact and 
labour rights, and on the freedom of the media, and through these broad policy domains, to SDGs 
relating to hunger and food security, inequalities of income and gender, and to forests, as well as to 
those relevant to growth, jobs, and livelihoods.  
 
These findings support the view that there is a strong developmental case for widening civic space in 
Cambodia, notwithstanding the strong political incentives for the regime to restrict and control. In 
addition, there may be particularly robust reasons to view closing civic space as an assault on the 
economic rights of Cambodian women, whose struggles with issues of land ownership and control as 
well as labour rights in the export sectors have been championed by civic actors at home and 
internationally, and who now face being silenced, suppressed, or co-opted by the political regime. 
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Annex 
 
Figure 3 Life expectancy 
 
Source: 4 World Development Indicators 
 
Figure 4 Maternal mortality 
 
Source: 5 World Development Indicators 
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Figure 5 Infant mortality 
 
Source: 6 World Development Indicators 
 
 
Figure 6 Immunization 
 
Source: 7 World Development Indicators 
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Figure 7 Primary net enrolment rates 
 
Source: 8 World Development Indicators 
 
Figure 8 Improved sanitation facilities 
 
Source: 9 World Development Indicators 
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Figure 9 Improved water source 
 
Source: 10 World Development Indicators 
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